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Abstract: As Australia is moving towards a national curriculum 
there are also activities to nationalise teacher education.  This 
involves various departments of state and federal governments, 
third-party bodies funded by government such as the Curriculum 
Corporation and Teaching Australia, and non-government 
organisations such as the Business Council of Australia.  These 
agencies are producing models and principles which aim on 
establishing standards of best practice for how they want teachers 
to teach.  Within all of this activity the term ‘pedagogy’ is often 
employed to represent aspects of these best practices.  Examples 
include ‘productive pedagogies’, ‘new pedagogies’, ‘pedagogical 
content knowledge’ and ‘pedagogical strategies’.  However these 
are all means only without any end purposes which identify them 
as being valuable for education.  In this paper I will argue that in 
order to have educative value teachers themselves must exercise a 
degree of professional autonomy to bring their own end purposes 
to their choice of pedagogy. 
 
 
Different conceptions of pedagogy can be identified but basically it usually refers 
to the ‘science’ or ‘theory’ of teaching and some sources indicate that it can also refer to 
the ‘art’ of teaching.  However reference to a ‘science’ or ‘theory’ can make the term 
attractive to employ in an attempt to lift the kudos of the profession because ‘pedagogy’ 
rather than ‘teaching’ has a more ‘intellectual’ aspect to it – especially if it can also be 
claimed to be research-led and evidence-based.  In ancient Greece the pedagogue 
(literally meaning to ‘lead the child’) was a slave employed to look after the schooling of 
children.  From Latin sources pedagogy can be understood to be equated with education.  
This latter term has rich moral and political aspects and includes purposeful 
considerations given to what sort of society we should be working towards, the type of 
persons we should become and how we should live well – especially with one another.  
However, it is contended here that in Australia this relation to education has been 
overlooked altogether.  Consequently we have an atrophied understanding of pedagogy 
which is represented only as a means or process of instructing and is totally neglectful of 
the end purposes which are intrinsic to education. 
This paper is divided into three sections.  The first shall review how pedagogy is 
being employed as a form of management for effectiveness rather than as an aspect of 
education.  As a result it is being reduced to atheoretical activities which only offer 
means without any ends or purposes which indicate that they have something valuable for 
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education.  The second section shall examine the nature of ends and the relation between 
ends and means.  The third and final section will endeavour to argue why and how 
teachers should bring educative end purposes to their own pedagogies by engaging with 
the aims of education in a professionally autonomous manner.   A mainly Deweyan 
perspective is adopted throughout the paper to explore these issues and to argue the need 
for teachers to become more involved with the philosophical aims of education in order 
to give their pedagogies educative value. 
 
 
Pedagogy as a Means Without an End 
 
‘Pedagogy’, like the term ‘professional’ is undergoing a contestation regarding its 
meaning.  Invariably government funded agencies reduce the term to represent only the 
means of teaching and learning and neglect to offer any aims or purposes which are able 
to identify their pedagogy as being of educational value beyond simply being effective 
for training.  For example the Curriculum Corporation (2005) defines pedagogy as 
“understanding teaching and learning”, Victoria’s Department of Education and Training 
(2005) as “how people learn”, Education Queensland (2004) as a “framework under 
which teachers can choose and develop strategies” (but are not at liberty to critique the 
framework or choose another), Robertson et al. (2008) through an ARC linkage project 
involving the University of Tasmania and the Tasmanian Department of Education define 
it as the “activities that impart knowledge” [their emphasis], and Teaching Australia 
(2008), who omit the term ‘education’ from teacher education and reduce teacher 
preparation specifically to ‘training’ are currently conducting a project to establish a 
National Centre for Pedagogy which will centralise “knowledge about effective [rather 
than educative] teaching and learning”.  What these organisations offer are only what 
Beck (2008, p. 135) describes as “‘cradle-to-the-grave’ framework[s] within which 
teachers are increasingly constrained to pursue their ‘professional development’ and 
career progression.”  These frameworks typically consist of methods, strategies and 
models involving learning styles, multiple intelligences, scaffolding and reflection.  All 
of these have very little theoretical support and which Dewey (1907, p. 158), if he were 
still alive today, might well have described as being examples of “trivial devices and 
patent panaceas” because they can only offer means and are unable to engage with 
educational issues.  What is clearly missing is what he referred to as ends-in-view. 
Dewey (1916, p. 176-7, 179) claimed that “nothing has brought pedagogical 
theory into greater disrepute than the belief that it is identified with handing out to 
teachers recipes and models to be followed in teaching” because such a procedure 
encourages teachers to “dispense with [the] exercise of his own judgment”.  Teachers are 
not to be reduced to human doings but are to be understood as beings, those who actively 
think as well as act.  Yet how often in recent times do we witness new methods, strategies 
and models being recommended to be copied and applied (not thought about or critiqued 
through professional forums), often in the guise of best practice?  Dewey was very clear 
that in order for teachers to be able to educate, they need to exercise their critical capacity 
of judgment making and this capability must necessarily be embedded in understandings 
of the purpose(s) of education. 
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Due to the lack of educative end-purposes accompanying the various ‘best 
practices’ or pedagogies it needs to be recognised that pedagogy, as a means only, is not 
educative.  Indeed as a ‘science’ or ‘theory’ of principles for effective instruction, 
pedagogy can be equally useful for organisations who wish to oppress, indoctrinate or 
brain-wash learners.  This is because the principles of best practice are limited to being 
only managerially effective at imparting information and developing skills and so they 
are clearly not necessarily educative.  This replacement of education by pedagogy has 
been recognised by Hinchliffe (2001) who claims that we might have to “accept that we 
have been misusing the term [education] and start to get into the habit of calling the bulk 
of what goes on in our schools and colleges, pedagogy rather than education”.  He 
suggests that we might have to choose between education or pedagogy. 
Blake et al. (1998) argue that since the late 1960s and early 70s the foundations of 
education which had very clear theoretical guiding principles for education have been 
replaced with forms of atheoretical reflective practices which simply focus upon the 
methods of best practices and pedagogies.  They argue that the demise of the foundations 
has not been replaced by any other discipline of study but by: 
the personal (but largely atheoretical) reflection of the “reflective 
practitioner” [which] is supposed to do whatever job here needs 
doing, with the help of a few Introductions to Management 
nostrums and Learning Method techniques.  In a neat marrying of 
the themes of performativity and the rejection of grand narratives 
or foundational theories, governments in many parts of the world 
have intervened in the curriculum of what used to be called 
teacher education in order to replace the study of education for 
prospective teachers with training in “effective skills” and 
classroom competencies. (Blake et al., 1998, p. 3) 
Certainly Teaching Australia, the Curriculum Corporation and the Business Council of 
Australia all fit this description of intervening in the curriculum of theoretically rigorous 
university-based teacher education programs in order to have these replaced with training 
in pedagogy which only focus upon effectiveness.  However, many universities too are 
succumbing to this trend. 
Pedagogy, as a form of effective management of learning, readily becomes a 
means only because it is presumed to offer a link between the intentionality of curriculum 
designers and the actual learning outcomes which are developed in learners.  Sometimes 
this presumed link receives support from empirical data which supposedly demonstrates 
that certain teaching procedures cause learning to occur more efficiently and effectively.  
In this climate of performativity government agencies often attempt to justify their 
frameworks of best pedagogical practices through references to such ‘evidence’ which is 
also frequently described as being ‘scientific’.  This appears to be so attractive that Slavin 
(2007) reports that in the No Child Left Behind Policy references are made to 
‘scientifically based evidence’ 110 times.  However the evidence referenced for 
supporting best pedagogical practices are not scientific but are only empirical and 
Fenstermacher (1978; 1986) warns against the tempting but fatal leap often made from 
correlations obtained from empirical data to claims for causal relations.  While such 
claims lend themselves to formulating recommendations for teaching practice he 
observes that what is dominant in the literature is a focus upon successful teaching rather 
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than good teaching (i.e. educating with moral purpose as well as sound epistemology), for 
which there appears a dearth of research regarding this latter type. 
The practises which are promoted through the pedagogies of various agencies 
lack ends or justifications as to why such technical and instrumental approaches should be 
regarded as ‘good’ and as appropriate for schooling and for education particularly, other 
than for making learning more effective.  The obsession for making performance as 
effective as possible has marginalised opportunity to engage with the big picture of 
schooling – what its purposes or ‘ends’ should be.  Consequently discussions around 
pedagogy suffer from this constraint and only address effective means of teaching and 
learning, never about the ends of pedagogies such as what we are educating for?  It is also 
argued by Pring (2004, p. 15) that “it is one of the absurdities of much research into the 
‘effective school’” that the big picture issues which are part of an educational 
justification are ignored. 
Dewey (1938a, p. 67) reminds us through Plato that slaves such as pedagogues 
were employed to “execute the purposes of another”.   So we see from this that teachers 
cannot be professionals, in the sense of autonomous educators by becoming pedagogical 
slaves either to the will/purpose/policies of others or to their assumed evidence-based 
principles and rules for conduct.  This is clearly identified by Bailey who concludes that 
“what an autonomous teacher could not do, and retain autonomy, would be to consider 
the teacher’s role simply as that of agent for someone else’s decision-making, especially 
where such another was not a professional educator” (quoted by Beck, 2008, p. 128).  
Consequently Beck reminds us that as professional educators teachers should be 
accountable to ends such as those found in educational theory and not just those which 
are driven by bureaucratic efficiencies.  The ends embedded in intellectual rigor can 
provide the pedagogy of teachers with educative value.  Dewey argued that teachers 
should not be pedagogical slaves who passively conform to the will of authoritarian 
elites.  He recognised that education must be practiced democratically if a society is to 
become authentically democratic. 
Pedagogy has become so highly technicist and limited in its scope that it is 
causing teaching to be reduced to the compliant application of best principles as if these 
were universally the ‘best’ for all contexts.  The argument is being made here that as 
educators, teachers must bring end purposes to their pedagogy in order to provide it with 
educative value.  Not all teaching approaches are educative.  Therefore teachers ought to 
be enabled to discriminate between the sorts of pedagogy which are educative and which 
are not by focusing upon the big-picture issues of their end purposes.  This is not a 
proposal that we should return to foundationalism (Carr, 2006) in order to rescue the 
study of education from an over emphasis on effective skill acquisition for the sole 
purpose of improving standards of performance.  What is being argued for here is that our 
pedagogies should be accompanied with clearly articulated and justified ends-in-view or 
purposes and that these end purposes must be participated in and contributed to by 
individual teachers themselves.  In order to appreciate this importance that teachers have 
in exercising their professional autonomy to critically determine the ends of their 
pedagogy, the following section will now examine the nature of ends and their 
inextricable relation to means. 
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The Nature of Ends 
 
In the spirit of Neil Postman’s The End of Education (1995) the argument is being 
made here that pedagogy has come to an end for education since in its various forms it 
generally fails to clearly articulate its end purposes for education.  In his book Postman 
claims there are two problems faced by schooling. The first is an engineering problem 
which engages with the means of how learners learn and the second is a metaphysical 
problem which provides the big picture justifications for particular approaches and 
addresses significant issues such as what sorts of persons ought learners to become.  He 
argues that: 
It is important to keep in mind that the engineering of learning is 
very often puffed up, assigned an importance it does not 
deserve… there is no one who can say that this or that is the best 
way to know things, to feel things, to see things, to remember 
things, to apply things, to connect things and that no other will do 
as well.  In fact, to make such a claim is to trivialize learning, to 
reduce it to a mechanical skill. (Postman, 1995, p. 3) 
Through a focus on pedagogy as a means only, learning can certainly be trivialised.  Our 
language has become dominated with managerial terms such as best practices, effective 
and efficient methods and performance, without any justification as to what educative 
ends these means should be used for attaining.  Consequently Postman (1995, p. 26) 
comments that “There was a time when educators became famous for providing reasons 
for learning; now they become famous for inventing a method”.  He laments that the 
second challenge he identified for schooling – the metaphysical challenge – is either 
neglected or avoided altogether.  This particular challenge offers educators an 
opportunity to articulate and justify a why for the how of their pedagogy and for 
schooling generally.  He warns that if this challenge is overlooked or neglected, then 
“there is no surer way to bring an end to schooling [i.e. education] than for it to have no 
end” (Postman, 1995, p. 4). 
These two different meanings for ‘end’ (i.e. termination/completion and overall 
end purpose) were also understood by Dewey but he actively sought to demonstrate how 
they both are related.  He stated that: 
Likewise, the ideas of a goal for a runner in a race or of a target 
for an archer are obstructive not helpful unless they are 
translations of the final mark as an existence into means whereby 
– procedural means.  The runner employs the thought of the goal 
as means of regulating his pace, etc., at different stages of his 
running; the archer uses the thought of the target, in connections 
with observations of the direction and force of wind, etc., as a 
guide or direction in taking aim.  The difference between the two 
senses of end, namely, end-in-view and end as objective 
termination and completion, is striking proof of the fact that in 
inquiry the termination is not just realistically apprehended and 
enunciated but is stated as a way of procedure.  (Dewey, 1938b, p. 
169) 
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Dewey here argues that this end-in-view or end purpose is an anticipation of 
an existential consequence and directly influences our way of being and the 
manner and means by which we perform our actions.  That is, as ends they 
also become embedded aspects of our means.  Ends and means should not be 
presented in a dichotomous fashion nor should ends be considered as 
somehow “lying beyond activity” (Dewey, 1922, p. 154).  Therefore what 
Dewey is signalling here is that the means of a teacher’s practice is 
inextricably related to her end purposes or theory – whether these latter 
aspects have been clearly articulated or not.  Attempting to separate theory 
from practice through notions of pedagogy as a means only is also recognised 
by Deborah Britzman as being highly problematic for the professionalism of 
teachers.  She argues that there are tensions between “knowing and being, 
thought and action, theory and practice” which should be appreciated as being 
“lived as individual dilemmas” for the thinking teacher as professional.  
Without this integration of thought with action, she concludes that teaching 
becomes limited “to a mechanical problem of transmission” (Britzman, 2003, 
pp. 29 & 53).  Famously known for his opposition to dichotomous thinking, 
Dewey strongly opposed the notion that pedagogy should be considered as 
only a practical activity, as a means without concurrently also having 
overarching end purposes which include a vision of the sort of society that is 
being worked towards. 
In his 1902 essay The Educational Situation Dewey argued that the reformers of 
education in his day tended to be too much into theory while the conservatives controlled 
the realm of schooling where the actual practice was taking place.  A century later we 
continue to see conservative forces dominate school practices through government 
departments and agencies such as the Curriculum Corporation and Teaching Australia, 
and importantly, they continue to avoid theory in the sense of providing any unity to 
means and ends.  However, they currently appear to be aggressively seeking to control 
the theory related to the profession of teaching in addition to the practice (Beck, 2008; 
Flinders and Thornton, 2004) and in doing so replace it altogether with atheoretical 
activities.  Under such dominant political control which has as its interest the 
conservation of the status quo, Dewey (2001, p. 397) recognised that all that was required 
of teachers is “to study the mechanics of successfully carrying into effect the prescribed 
matter of instruction” and they did not need to bother themselves with studying “its 
educative bearing” or indeed any of “the most fundamental educational problems”.   
In his essay on pedagogy, Dewey argued that teaching should not be limited to the 
notion that it is simply an application of a repertoire of methods only, without some deep 
and complex theoretical understandings driving these activities.  He stated that “the 
question of subject-matter and method is indeed of supreme importance because it is the 
question of how the machinery of the institution is to touch human life… the question of 
method is impossible to divorce from that of subject-matter” (Dewey, 1896, p. 287).  The 
subject matter of most significance is argued here not to be discipline specific knowledge 
as recommended by Shulman (2004) who has introduced the now popular notion of 
content pedagogical knowledge, but rather it is that of education itself which cannot be 
separated from the particular methods, content or strategies we use in our teaching. 
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Dewey (1916, p. 177) clearly considered teaching to be primarily an art rather 
than a ‘science’ and described this art as “action intelligently directed by ends.”  William 
James before him also regarded teaching to be mostly an art and consequently warned 
teachers from choosing to be “docile” by plunging into the discipline of psychology to 
provide a scientific basis to their work.  While written over a century ago this warning 
still has great value for both teachers and those who prepare them in programs of 
education who believe that the descriptive nature of psychology can somehow provide 
the foundations of the normative nature of educational practices.  James declared: 
I say moreover that you (teachers) make a great, a very great 
mistake, if you think that psychology, being the science of the 
mind’s laws, is something from which you can deduce definite 
programmes and schemes and methods of instruction for 
immediate school-room use. (James, 1899, p. 15) 
Here James differentiates between the abstract and analytical attitude of the psychologist 
compared with the moral obligation of the teacher as educator seeking the good and the 
best for the human child who is before her.  He was quite clear that in order to educate, 
the teacher cannot rely upon a science or evidence base to determine what she ought to do 
for the good of her particular learners.  Empirical observations cannot lend themselves to 
the formulation of universal rules of conduct – especially moral conduct.  What is 
necessary is for the individual teacher to be able to pursue a notion of the good for each 
and every one of her students.  This requires her to exercise some professional autonomy 
in determining what the purposes or aims of her pedagogy ought to be.  Formulating 
one’s own aims of education in order to bring educative value to one’s pedagogy shall 
now be addressed in this final section. 
 
 
Bringing an Educational End to Pedagogy through Aims 
 
The general problem Dewey described above was the separation from practice 
and theory, doing from thinking, and so pedagogy without a thoughtful and intellectual 
educative purpose can be understood to have come to an end for education.  What 
pedagogy needs of course are end purposes of an educative kind which distinguishes it 
from others which foster fundamentalism, indoctrination and unethical practices.  In 
order to make one’s pedagogy educative, educational end purposes must be brought to it.  
Such purposes not only provide the warrant, justification and raison d’être but they also 
articulate a vision of the ultimate value of the education which is being provided.  This 
does not necessarily work against the bureaucratic concern for effectiveness as if a vision 
of ultimate value must necessarily be ineffective as Dewey (2001, p. 402) argued that any 
“efficiency in conduct” such as pedagogical activity, must have as a prerequisite “an 
enlightenment of vision”.  Efficiency can only be given value in an overall understanding 
of the purpose of education.  This necessitates that such a vision is not just an ‘ideal’ 
because being idealistic it would exist in a realm other than that in which we ourselves 
have our practical existence.  Consequently philosophers of education refer instead to 
‘aims’ as these, unlike ideals, take account of the practicalities in which we are 
inescapably involved. 
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There are four characteristics of such aims which are able to bring educative value 
to pedagogies and these are as follows: individual teachers must be active participants in 
the formation of these aims; these aims should be continually open for democratic re-
evaluation; they are philosophical in nature; and they must address the personhood of 
learners.  Dewey (1916, p. 114) recognised that “education as such has no aims.  Only 
persons, parents and teachers, etc., have aims”.  This identifies the first of these four – 
that aims must be actively contributed towards by individual teachers within their own 
situations.  Aims cannot be provided by education itself nor by centralised bureaucratic 
authorities.  This is because ‘education’ itself is an abstract concept while teachers are 
concrete and relate to particular and real learners.  In his discussion on aims in education 
Dewey described these as being situated by the lives of the individuals becoming 
educated and that they ought to be co-operatively participated in by both these learners 
and their teachers.  Consequently he warned that “educators have to be on their guard 
against ends that are alleged to be general and ultimate” (Dewey, 1916, p. 116) because 
such aims are likely to be too abstract to offer significant value for individual learners in 
their own particular situations. 
This first characteristic is difficult to manage from a bureaucratic management 
perspective which wishes to standardise activities in all schools for the express purpose 
of seeking efficiencies and accountabilities.  However, Dewey contended that educative 
value can only be realized in the lives of existing individuals and their communities.  
Educative value cannot be imposed as if they were ultimate and universal for all contexts 
which for us would include remote Aboriginal community schools and inner city 
grammar schools.  This requires individual teachers to operate as professionals with a 
degree of autonomy in order to operate by their own ends which focus upon education, 
not just effectiveness.  Such autonomy is in contrast to becoming compliant and passive 
servants of the state as reflected in the ancient Greek notion of the pedagogue.  Teachers 
ought therefore to be encouraged to have the courage to exercise independence and 
responsibility for being an educator.  Dewey (1929, p. 38) argued that “until educators 
get the independence and courage to insist that educational aims are to be formed as well 
as executed within the educative process, they will not come to consciousness of their 
own function.” 
Through this assertion here Dewey was careful to qualify that it is the educative 
process which should be independent and not that individual teachers can simply ‘do 
whatever they please’.  As educators we have a role in the process but we do not operate 
as independent, atomistic units.  This brings us to a second characteristic of educational 
aims which is that they should be continually open for democratic re-evaluation.  Dewey 
was very focussed on re-constructing society through the social intelligence of its 
members and he regarded the educative development of this intelligence to depend on a 
democratic engagement with others.  This democratic characteristic does not simply 
involve one’s complying with the vote of the majority but rather it is descriptive of the 
open and critical inquiry members are able to engage with while evaluating aims and 
purposes to examine their proposed value.  Consequently the aims of individual teachers 
are to be articulated and made public so that they can be critically engaged with through 
dialogue with others, theories of others and the consequences of their own particular 
practices.  This would ensure that the aims of individual teachers are embedded in a 
social process. 
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The third characteristic of educational aims is that they are philosophical in 
nature.  Dewey (1916, p. 338) claimed that “philosophy may even be defined as the 
general theory of education”.  He described philosophy as being “concerned primarily 
with values – with the ends for the sake of which man acts” (Dewey, 1938c, p. 281).  
Being primarily concerned with ends does not exclude philosophy from offering 
important value to means such as pedagogy.  Dewey (1938d, p. 350) regarded ends and 
means to be inextricably related, stating that “I hold that the end in the sense of 
consequences provides the only basis for moral ideas and action, and therefore provides 
the only justification that can be found for means employed.”  If best practices consist in 
the expected pedagogy to be applied, then Dewey here claims that the only grounds for 
their justification must reference their relationship to morality. 
For Western civilization both education and philosophy emerged together in 
ancient Greece.  Philosophy specifically addressed what the good and moral life might be 
while education addressed how such a life could be actualised.  Aims of education, being 
philosophical, should offer an articulation regarding the goodness or worthwhileness 
being offered to individual learners and to society.  This latter aspect requires such aims 
to also be political in nature.  Bureaucratic managerialism which exclusively focuses 
upon effective pedagogy as a means only, lacks what Plato referred to as the hou heneka 
meaning the “what for”.  Plato promoted the importance of this ‘what for’ in order to 
challenge the sophistry in his day which was being employed largely by politicians to 
manipulate the public opinion of the masses (Gadamer, 1986).  This understanding of 
‘what for’ enables us in practical terms to distinguish between good and bad, and without 
it school communities are without the criteria to evaluate the particular best pedagogical 
practices that might be imposed upon them.  They are being denied the vision of what 
sort of society they are contributing towards and what sort of persons they are becoming.  
These two aspects are interdependent. 
The fourth and final characteristic of educational aims being discussed here is that 
they have a focus upon the sort of persons that learners are becoming.  The Latin origins 
of the term curriculum stem from ‘race course’ or running the race itself and remind us 
that in addition to the track or course-content being run or engaged with, the educative 
curriculum also addresses the runner herself, i.e. the personhood of the learner.  
Knowledge of content and methods of delivery are never enough to provide an education.  
Consideration must also include the effects that experiences have upon the learners.  
Dewey (2001, p. 402) argued for example that “we need to know just what reading and 
writing and numbers do for the present life of the child”.  He called this ‘collateral 
learning’ which refers to the attitudes and habits that are being developed by learners.  
This aspect must acknowledge that persons are social beings and the sorts of persons we 
become determine the nature of our relations with others and the sort of society our 
communities become.  This is reflected by Postman’s (1995, p. 18) question “what kind 
of public does it [public schooling and the pedagogies practiced therein] create?”  Only 
an answer to this can provide the context for justifying pedagogies as to their educative 
value.   
It would appear then that the aims of pedagogies must engage in the big picture 
issues of what it means to be an educated person and what an educated society might be 
if they are to be educative.  In order to offer an alternative to learners other than for them 
to become docile consumers of popular culture and being politically oppressed or 
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manipulated, teachers need to have a clear view of what a worthwhile life might be like.  
They need to have an articulated and justified position regarding the sort of society they 
are working towards and even a meaning and purpose of life.  Indeed to have a meaning 
of education necessarily implies a meaning of life (Allen, 1991).  While this claim might 
initially appear to be a somewhat hyperbolic assertion, this is nevertheless argued to be 
essential if our pedagogies are to be recognised as being educative.  Certainly there is no 
universally agreed answer to the quest for the meaning of life and so each of us must 
engage personally with the significant existential challenge of determining how one 
ought to live a purposeful and meaningful life. 
Rather than focus exclusively on the economics of instructing for only effective 
learning or ‘imparting knowledge’, pedagogy - if it is to be considered as educative - 
ought to provide end purposes, often referred to as aims of education.  Importantly these 
need to be formulated by individual educators themselves and not just government 
departments.  This is in contradistinction to the focus given by government funded 
agencies which would prefer that their own aims be uncritically implemented by teachers 
rather than have teachers base their practices upon their own aims which have been 
formulated autonomously based upon an understanding of educational theory which lies 
beyond bureaucratic domination.  This tension between whose aims are to have most 
influence certainly has implications for what it might mean for teaching to be a 
profession.   
Not all pedagogies are educative.  The contrast between pedagogy as a means 
only and having an end which informs the judgements that professional educators must 
make, can be recognised as providing an important characteristic of pedagogies if indeed 
they are to be considered as having value for education.  To actualize such value for 
one’s pedagogy one does not need to exclusively rely upon a Deweyan perspective.  Carr 
(2003, p. 36) refers to the professional autonomy that all teachers should be able to 
exercise by their being embedded in the theoretical complexities of education.  In 
addition to the general intellectual aspect of educational theory teachers must 
authentically engage in the uniqueness of their own contexts.  This professional 
sensitivity for the situation in which one has a presence is recognised by Blake et al. 
(2000) who argue that teachers ought to see themselves primarily in relationships of care 
with others, where these others are treated as persons in their own right rather than as 
objects to be manipulated or are available for depositing information into.  Guiding these 
professional relations is a moral vision which Charles Taylor (1991, p. 16) describes as 
having “a picture of what a better or higher mode of life would be, where ‘better’ and 
‘higher’ are defined not in terms of what we happen to desire or need, but offer a standard 
of what we ought to desire”.  This is best served by an open and democratic environment 
in which we all are able to participate and critique in the formation of aims of education 
as the vision from which we operate.  This is turn then determines our pedagogy. 
To reverse this priority, that is, to place primary emphasis upon a standardized, 
universal pedagogy as a means for attaining effectiveness rather than upon the purposes 
of education, is likely to result in the sorts of teaching that are oppressive or mis-
educative.  Dewey has warned us that pedagogical theory is brought into disrepute if its 
means – as models and strategies – are over-emphasised.  There cannot be any educative 
justification for such pedagogical strategies that focus solely upon effectiveness of 
learning as some authorities recommend through their notions of best practice.  As 
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Postman (1995, p. 26) has observed, the main problem that an overemphasis on methods 
has, is “that it diverts attention from important matters” and what could be more 
important than what sort of persons we are educating the public to become? 
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